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Abstract
The stability and growth of the international trade regime is threatened by the emergence and
proliferation of anti-offshoring measures by governments worldwide. The business practice of off-
shoring transfers domestic production of goods and services abroad as a means of achieving optimal
use ofa firm's resources and capitalizing on comparative advantage. While companies have relo-
cated manufacturing activities for centuries, the emergence and growth of services offshoring in
recent decades has not only contributed significantly to greater global economic growth and prosper-
ity, but also ignited a fluctuating frenzy of protectionist fears and measures at national and sub-
national levels against offshoring that continues to the present day. Such a backlash is based on
concerns that offshoring results in domestic job losses, wage reduction and inequality, and disruption
of business innovation and productivity. This motivates examination of the legitimacy of these
perceptions and the legality of governmental actions in the offshoring arena, as such measures
undercut and potentially violate the commitments made by nations to the World Trade Organiza-
tion and various other trade agreements. In the United States, the majority of state governments
have proposed anti-offshoring bills, several of which have been enacted. The U.S. Constitution
empowers the federal government with exclusive authority over the areas of interstate commerce,
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foreign affairs, and foreign trade. All these constitutional principles are arguably violated when
state governments enact anti-offshoring legislation. The U.S. experience is not singular, as similar
policies are being considered and/or implemented in other nations or nation-groups. In particular,
the European Union (EL9 and a host of other countries have adopted discriminatory measures
relating to personal data protection that place foreign service suppliers at a disadvantage compared
to their domestic counterparts. These countries and the EU are strong proponents offree trade and
have signed onto a variety of trade agreements. Adherence to these commitments means accepting
that free trade is a two-way street and comes with benefits and constraints. Furthermore, countries
must look beyond restrictive approaches to embrace a combination of pro-business policies that pro-
mote labor market flexibility and investment as well as employment security initiatives around
worker retraining and mobility to resolve the short-term distributional effects of globalization.
These issues are analyzed with respect to the current situation.
I. Introduction
The vital role that offshoring plays in advancing global economic growth and prosperity
necessitates an examination of the legality and popularity of anti-offshoring measures
across the globe.' Offshoring moves production of goods and services from domestic to
foreign locations to increase efficient use of a firm's resources. 2 Offshoring, a longstand-
ing and profitable cross-border practice, includes outsourcing activities to third parties
abroad and insourcing activities to foreign affiliates.3 While relocation of manufacturing
processes abroad has been a common operational strategy for many years and was well
established by the 1980s, 4 the rise of globalization in the past two decades has spurred the
emergence and growth of services offshoring to the present day.s The globalizing forces
propelling offshoring include the convergence of trade liberalization policies, increasing
global labor supply, foreign investment, and rapid technological advances in transporta-
tion and communications. 6 The availability of an offshore labor pool with a diverse skill
set, for example, enables firms to achieve efficiency gains by hiring them to perform tasks
in which they have comparative advantage.7 As a result, the global trade structure has
1. See, e.g., Gary Gereffi & Karina Fernandez-Stark, The Offihore Services Value Chain Developing Countries
and the Crisis, 2 (The World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5262, 2010), available at http://
elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5262 (noting that services offshoring "has become an im-
portant source for employment and economic growth around the globe").
2. Amar Gupta, David A. Gantz, Devin Sreecharana & Jeremy Kreyling, Evolving Relationship Between
Law, Offihoring of Professional Services, Intellectual Property, and International Organizations, 21 INFo. RE-
SOURCES MGMT. J. 103, 103 (2008).
3. DESIRPE VAN WELSUM & XAVIER REIF, POTENTIAL OFFSHORING: EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED
OECD COUNTRIES 3 (2005), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/cbrown/el53_sp06/
2005btfwelsum.pdf.
4. The Story so Far, Offihoring has Brought Huge Economic Benefits, but at a Heavy Political Price, EcoNo-
MisT, Jan. 19, 2013, at 5, available at http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21569574-offshoring-
has-brought-huge-economic-benefits-heavy-political-price-story-so [hereinafter The Story so Far].
5. William Milberg & Deborah Winkler, Actual and Perceived Effects of Offihoring on Economic Insecurity:
The Role of Labour Market Regimes, in MAKING GLOsAIzATION SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE 163 (Marc
Bacchetta & Marion Jansen eds., 2011).
6. Id.
7. Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano, Giovanni Peri & Greg C. Wright, Immigration, Offihoring and American Jobs
2 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1147, 2012), available at http://cep.se.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dpl 147.pdf.
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been altered to one of "trade in tasks," where the production process has broadened to
include performance of intermediated tasks by low-skill or high-skill labor.8
Services offshoring potentially encompasses any task that may be performed anywhere;
these tasks rely heavily on information and communication technologies with the resulting
product being delivered via these technologies.9 Other distinguishing attributes of off-
shorable tasks include use of codifiable knowledge content and no requirement of face-to-
face contact.'0 Intermediate processes such as office and administrative support, business
and financial operations, and computer and mathematical services share these characteris-
tics and have already been offshored.11 Firms from industrialized countries have also be-
gun to offshore "core competencies," related to marketing, finance, research,
development, and design.12 Furthermore, a 2005 study of selected Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation (OECD) countries estimated that nearly 20 percent of total employ-
ment in low and high skill white-collar occupations is potentially affected by offshoring.13
In particular, business services including accounting, consulting, financial services, and
research and development experience a relatively high share of such impact.' 4 A later
study, by Blinder and Krueger (2009), focusing on the United States, found that in the
aggregate, 25 percent of U.S. jobs were offshorable, whereas at a specific job level, 70
percent to 80 percent of tasks were offshorable.s The expansion of offshoring into new
industries and business processes has generated great concern among policymakers and
the public across the globe.16 Services offshoring, in particular, incites pronounced anxi-
ety in industrialized countries, as much of the public views the migration of jobs in these
sectors as the remaining bastions of economic security.' 7 One Eurobarometer of selected
EU nations spanning from 2004 to 2008 revealed that all participants, except Denmark
and Sweden, associated offshoring with job displacement and instability.' 8 In the United
States, a 2007 survey showed that 75 percent of the nation believed "outsourcing work
overseas hurts American workers."19 Such a strong response is attributed to a 2003 For-
rester study estimating the loss of 3.3 million U.S. jobs over a fifteen-year period as a
result of services offshoring. 20 The potential of job losses in this sector elicited greater
outrage than the decline of low-skilled manufacturing jobs, as white-collar work repre-
8. Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5, at 159.
9. vA WELSUM & REIF, supra note 3, at 6.
10. Id.
11. Roger J. Moncarz, Michael G. Wolf & Benjamin Wright, Service-Providing Occupations, Offihoring, and
the Labor Market, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2008, at 72, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2008/12/
art4full.pdf.
12. Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5, at 166.
13. vA WELSUM & REIF, supra note 3, at 6.
14. Id.
15. Alan S. Blinder, On the Measurability of Offshoring, VOX (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/
twenty-five-percent-us-jobs-are-offshorable.
16. Id.
17. Gene M. Grossman & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Trading Tasks: A Simple Tbeory of Offsboring 7 (Nat'I
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12721, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl2721; Milberg & Winkler, suipra note 5, at 180-181.
18. Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5, at 181.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 180.
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sented a primary area of future job prospects and growth.21 Additionally, the 2007 - 2008
financial crisis deepened anti-offshoring sentiments in many countries as a result of high
levels of unemployment. 22
To quell these fears, one immediate and popular response has been and continues to be
the promotion and/or implementation of anti-offshoring bills, laws, and policies by vari-
ous governments and regional governing bodies. 23 These measures generally fall in two
categories, (1) restrictions against overseas procurement of goods and services by govern-
ment agencies at national and/or subnational levels and (2) restrictions or financial penal-
ties imposed against firms for moving production processes overseas. 24 For instance,
several U.S. states have proposed or enacted bans against performance of public contract
work overseas or limit performance of public contract work to those legally authorized to
work in the United States.25 As this paper will demonstrate, these measures not only
potentially violate the legally binding commitments made by countries that are parties to
international and multilateral trade agreements, but they actually impede economic secur-
ity and growth on domestic and global levels. These measures implicate multijurisdic-
tional matters and entities and likely need to meet additional conditions beyond domestic
enactment in order to be legally valid. Laws of national and sub-national governments
must be consistent with the constitutions of their respective countries as well as with com-
mitments under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and other pertinent trea-
ties and agreements.
While there is no world government to formulate and enact international laws, cross-
border treaties and agreements constitute one primary mechanism for attaining a rule of
law at the global level. 26 By way of examples, laws passed by U.S. state and local govern-
ments must comport with applicable international, multi-lateral, or bi-lateral treaties and
agreements, where such agreements are applicable. 27 In Europe, the European Union
(EU) acts as a supranational body whose regulations and directives can be binding upon
concerned national governments. 28 But EU directives may, in turn, need to comply with
21. Id.
22. The Story so Far, supra note 4, at 2.
23. E.g., Ofibore Outsourcing: Impact on the American Workplace, BRAUN CONSULTING NEWS (Braun Con-
sulting Grp., Seattle, WA), Summer 2004, at 45 available at http://www.braunconsulting.com/bcg/newslet-
ters/summer2004/summer2004.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2014); Sunni Yuen, Exporting Trust with Data: Audited
Self-Regulation as a Solution to Cross-Border Data Transfer Protection Concerns in the Offihore Outsourcing Industry
9 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REv. 41 (2008).
24. E.g., SHANNON KLINGER & M. LYNN SYKEs, EXPORTING THE LAW: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL OUTSOURCING LEGISLATION 4-16 (2004), available at http://www.nfap.com/researchactivi-
ties/studies/NFAPStudyExportingLaw_0404.pdf.
2 5. Id.
26. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization offurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 358 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("The treaty-making power is broad enough to
cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations, and ... any conflicting law of the State must
yield."); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United States is not
limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and ... [it] does extend to all proper subjects of negotia-
tion between our government and other nations."); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (rejecting
the state's property interest in migratory fowl in favor of supporting the significance of the national interest
involved, the need for international cooperation, and the infeasibility of relying on state self-regulation).
28. Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy In The European Union: Some Cautionary Tales Frono
American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1612, 1622 - 29 (2002).
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the mandates of global supranational bodies, such as the 'WTO. 29 This hierarchy of legal
structures provides a mechanism to study the legality of laws, bills, and policies that in-
hibit or discourage offshoring.
In order to better understand the current situation, Part H of this paper discusses the
global nature and impact of services offshoring, with particular focus on actual and per-
ceived benefits and costs, in order to examine the legitimacy and effectiveness of anti-
offshoring measures. Part El builds upon empirical observations of offshoring to legal
analysis of anti-offshoring measures, starting with the legal framework of international
trade and the applicability and scope of commitments made by countries to national and
multilateral trade agreements. Part TV extends the legal analysis to examine anti-offshor-
ing measures across the globe, focusing on the United States as a case study for violations
against its own constitution and international obligations. To assess the legal legitimacy of
these actions, the section will also examine personal data restriction legislation by nations
and nation-groups, such as the EU, to determine whether public policy concerns serve as a
valid defense. Finally, Part V concludes that the lack of empirical evidence and legal basis
on domestic and international levels to justify anti-offshoring measures requires explora-
tion of alternative approaches. For instance, nations such as Denmark have shown that
costs of offshoring may be successfully overcome through a combination of pro-business
policies that promote labor market flexibility and investment as well as employment secur-
ity initiatives around worker retraining and mobility.
II. The Global Impact of Offshoring: Actual and Perceived Benefits and
Costs
An evaluation of the legitimacy of anti-offshoring measures first requires a determina-
tion of true benefits and costs that are supported in empirical evidence, as several widely
accepted perceptions and theories that motivate support for these measures are either mis-
placed or exaggerated.30 To determine the difference between actual and speculative ef-
fects of offshoring, this section will evaluate the veracity of the following assertions
invoked to justify anti-offshoring measures: (1) relocation of production processes results
in job displacement and lower wages for domestic workers; (2) trade in tasks flows one-
way from industrialized to developing countries, enabling the latter to primarily benefit
from this exchange; (3) geographical distribution of workers is a barrier to innovation and
competitive strength; and (4) face-to-face interaction is required to achieve optimal pro-
ductivity. 31 Before delving into the empirical evidence presented throughout this section,
it is important to note that no official data exists that directly measures offshoring.32 The
following indirect measures are used as proxies: data on trade in services, employment
data, input-output tables, and trade in intermediates.3 3
29. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, The EU Institutions and Their Modus Operandi in the World Trading System, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125, 167 (2005-2006).
30. See generally Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5.
31. See generally Amar Gupta et al., Use of Collaborative Technologies and Knowledge Sharing in Co-Located and
Distributed Teams: Towards the 24-h Knowledge Factory, 18 J. or STRATEGIC INFO. Sys. 147 (2009) [hereinafter
Collaborative Technologies].
32. VANT WELSUM & RElF, supra note 3, at 6.
33. Id.
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A. THE NEUTRAL (AND POTENTIALLY PosrnvE) LMPACT OF OFFSHORING ON THE
LABOR MARKET
It is widely assumed that offshoring is a zero-sum game that results in winners and
losers.34 One justification for this perception is that when firms cut costs and increase
profits through foreign relocation, domestic workers suffer from job displacement and
lower wages. 35 Econometric studies on the impact of offshoring on the labor market re-
veal several nuanced outcomes of offshoring's distributional effects that undermine and
bring greater complexity to such a blanket statement. 36 In particular, the "winners" are
not necessarily confined to companies, as other parties benefit either directly or indirectly
through offshoring's diffusive effect on the economy.37 Furthermore, any party subjected
to losses in this exchange may suffer in the short-term, but in the long-term, offshoring
creates better economic opportunities for all participants. 38
First, empirical evidence supports a finding of significant cost reduction for firms en-
gaging in offshoring. As alluded to earlier, globalization has enabled greater efficient re-
source allocation. The availability of foreign labor pools allows firms to capitalize on
comparative advantage by enabling them greater flexibility in matching individuals with
tasks best suited to their skill set.39 Transformative technological advances in transporta-
tion and communication have facilitated separation of tasks that allow firms to simultane-
ously profit from factor cost differences between countries and gains from specialization. 40
For example, developments in communications technology have reduced transaction costs
via instantaneous and electronic delivery of instructions and tasks. 4' In a study on services
offshoring and innovation by firms in Ireland from 2000 to 2004, Gorg & Hanley found
that offshoring had a positive effect on profitability as a consequence of capitalizing on
cheaper intermediate factors abroad.42 In particular, a 1 percent increase in offshoring
intensity increased the profit ratio by approximately 0.4 percent.43
Second, the body of empirical evidence on the relationship between offshoring and the
domestic labor market points to the complicated nature of offshoring's impact on jobs and
wages. Recent studies affirm an association between offshoring and job and wage losses
among domestic workers, but the extent of such losses point to the negligible impact of
such costs in the aggregate. 44 With regard to employment, an Amiti and Wie study found
that services offshoring between 1992 and 2000 reduced manufacturing employment in
34. Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5, at 157.
35. WINsTON W. CHANG, THE EcoNoMics OF OFFSHORING 1 (2012), http://faculty.washington.edu/
karyiu/confer/seal2/papers/Chang w.pdf.
36. See Milberg & Winkler, snpra note 5, at 160.
37. CHANG, supra note 35, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Ottaviano, Peri & Wright, supra note 7.
40. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 17, at 2.
41. Id.
42. See generally Holger Girg & Aoife Hanley, Services Outsourcing And Innovation: An Empirical Investiga-
tion (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Working Paper No. 1417, 2008), available at http://www.ifw-
members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/services-outsourcing-and-innovation-an-empirical-investigation- 1/kap_14
17_GoergHanley.pdf.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Ottaviano, Peri & Wright, supra note 7, at 24; Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5, at 164; CHANG, rupra
note 35, at 11.
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the United States by 0.4 percent annually in many sectors, but across all industries on a
national scale, this negative effect disappears.45 Such an outcome is attributed to greater
efficiency in some sectors as a byproduct of services offshoring, which has led to job crea-
tion in other sectors.46 These findings are affirmed by Ottaviano et. al's survey on fifty-
eight U.S. manufacturing industries from 2005 to 2007.47 There, offshoring had no effect
on domestic employment in the aggregate. 48 While it was clear that offshoring caused job
displacement in an industry, the productivity gains arising from employment abroad led to
commensurate increases in overall U.S. employment, thereby having a neutral impact on
domestic employment.49 In particular, offshoring propels domestic workers into more
complex work while their foreign counterparts focus on less-skilled tasks.s0
Just as significantly, van Welsum and Reif s study of selected OECD countries spanning
1996 to 2003 revealed similar results with respect to services offshoring.s' The analysis
showed that no systematic evidence supported an association between services offshoring
and employment decline at the aggregate level. 52 Similar to Ottaviano et. al's finding of
productivity gains, the only measurable impact indicated was a positive statistical associa-
tion with increasing demand for jobs involving information and communications technol-
ogies.5 3 Not only have existing services sectors expanded, but new services have been and
continue to be created in step with ongoing technological developments and services trade
liberalization.5 4 Finally, not only does offshoring's impact on employment vary at individ-
ual industry and aggregate levels but also upon worker skill level. With some exceptions,
studies have found that offshoring is associated with higher employment and wages for
high-skilled workers and a decline in employment for low-skilled workers.55
With respect to offshoring's impact on wages and the related issue of wage inequality,
the body of empirical research is less clear and requires further investigation.5 6 One long-
standing assumption, which arises from conventional trade theory, posits that wage ine-
quality widens in industrialized countries as a consequence of increased trade with
developing countries.57 The recent emergence of an opposing theory, postulated by
Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, opines that costs savings from trading tasks re-
sults in a "productivity effect" that leads to increased wages for low-skilled domestic work-
ers.58 Such a conclusion arises from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg's study on U.S.
offshoring of low-skilled intensive tasks during 1997 to 2004, which points to the emer-
45. Milberg & Winkler, rupra note 5, at 160.
46. Id.
47. Ottaviano, Peri & Wright, supra note 7, at 24.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 26.
51. See VAN WELSUM & REIF, supra note 3, at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Milberg & Winkler, supra note 5, at 159. Exceptions include a 2007 firm-level study of Germany and a
2008 study of Germany and the UK that associates offshoring with lower wages for high-skilled workers.
56. Koushik Ghosh, PeterJ. Saunders & Thomas Teneralli, Wage Inequality & Offshoring: Are They Related?,
11 INDIANJ. OF EcON. & Bus. 503, 507 (2012).
57. Id.
58. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 17, at 16.
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gence of this effect when falling costs of offshoring spurs increased trade in tasks.59 This
translates into greater productivity among low-skilled workers that generates rises in their
real wage and shared gains for all domestic factors.60
These observations were later tested in 2012 by Ghosh et al. in a follow-up study on
offshoring's impact on labor productivity and wage inequality.61 There, using quarterly
data from 1990 to 2011 and computing wage differences between low-skill and high-skill
workers in the United States, the study found that offshoring worsens income inequality
by negatively impacting low-skilled workers. 62 At the individual firm level, such a finding
is supported by a study led by Hummels et al. on offshoring's impact on wages by skill
type in Denmark.63 There, the study matched a population of Danish workers to Danish
private sector manufacturing firms spanning 1995 to 2006 and found that offshoring tends
to increase high-skill wages and reduce low-skill wages.64 In particular, the findings imply
that when a firm doubles its offshoring, the average low-skill worker of that firm will
suffer a net loss ranging from 4.04 percent to 11.55 percent in the present discounted
value (PDV) of income in the next five years.65 In contrast, the change to an average
high-skill worker's income in that firm will vary from a net loss of 1.44 percent to positive
increases of 4.92 percent within the same time period.66 These findings, however, must
be placed into further context, as the study went beyond analysis at the individual firm
level to conduct a comparison between Danish-based offshoring and non-offshoring man-
ufacturing firms.67 On a macro level, empirical evidence revealed that offshoring firms
paid their workers a higher average wage than their non-offshoring counterparts.68 Fur-
thermore, the former also outperformed the latter by generating higher sales, more em-
ployment, and larger capital/worker ratios. 69
Notwithstanding these mixed results with respect to wages, the body of research indi-
cates that offshoring not only benefits firms and workers but also society as a whole by
increasing average living standards worldwide.70 In developing countries, offshoring has
contributed to higher standards of living by raising incomes and spurring economic
growth. 71 In the United States, aggregate productivity gains in the manufacturing and
services sectors as a result of offshoring leads to rising standards of living.72 For example,
comparisons between U.S. offshoring and non-offshoring manufacturing firms across in-
dustries revealed that relative to the latter, offshoring firms enjoyed greater productivity,
utilized more skills, paid much higher wages, and had greater longevity and growth
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ghosh, Saunders & Teneralli, supra note 56.
62. Id. at 507 - 508.
63. See generally David Hummels et al., The Wage Effects of Oftihoring: Evidencefrom Danish Matched Worker-
Firm Data (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17496, 2013) available at http://www.kran
nert.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/research/OffshoringAERR3.pdf.
64. Id. at 1, 24.
65. Id. at 37.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 21.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. CArcG, supra note 35, at 1.
71. Id. at 14.
72. See id. at 12.
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rates.73 Also, Hummels et al.'s comparison of Danish offshoring and non-offshoring
firms, described above, affirms these results for manufacturing industries across the
board.74 Similar findings emerged in the U.S. services sectors in the aggregate, with U.S.
offshoring firms surpassing their non-offshoring counterparts through higher sales and
employment volumes, better worker compensation, and larger sales per worker.75 In a
comparison study within the same industry, services offshoring firms were in the fore-
front; they created 70 percent more jobs, reached higher sales by 100 percent, and offered
20 percent more in average compensation.76 Offshoring is associated with these increases
in industry productivity because it roots out inefficient firms and promotes the growth of
efficient firms able to capture larger export shares.77
B. OFFSHORING IS A MuLTI-DIREcTIONAL FLOW THAT CRISSCROSSES
INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In addition to expanding the definition of the "winners" from offshoring, research in
this area also undermines the related misperception that developing countries mostly ben-
efit from offshoring because production processes are primarily exported from industrial-
ized countries to developing countries. On the contrary, offshoring is a two-way street, as
many countries experience both rapid export and import growth of services.78 Using trade
in services as proxy for services offshoring, van Welsum and Reif conducted a study of
selected countries, tracking the average annual growth rate of imports and exports of busi-
ness, computer, and information services spanning from 1995 to 2003.79 The study found
that the following fifteen countries were among the top twenty countries with the fastest
growth of services exports and imports: United States, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Netherlands, India, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Spain, Singapore, Canada,
China, and Sweden.80 In particular, and contrary to American fears that offshoring is
reducing economic opportunities in the services sector, the United States is a net exporter
of services (meaning that the United States is the recipient of more offshoring activities
than it sends abroad).si U.S. firms enjoy the majority share of foreign business outsourc-
ing, which includes banking and accounting services and the securities market.82 Further-
more, most Asian-based banks and financial entities offshore back office and custodian
services to U.S. firms.83
Additionally, the increasing use of offshoring among Asian nations lends further sup-
port to the global nature and multi-directional flow of trade in services. 84 A 2006 KPMG
International survey of Asian-based firms, including Australia and New Zealand, revealed
73. Id. at 11.
74. Hummels et al., supra note 63, at 21.
75. CHANG, supra note 35, at 12.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. vA WELSUM & REIF, supra note 3, at 4.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 4.
81. CHANG, supra note 35, at 11.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 10.
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that in the aggregate, most respondents offshored to India, China, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines respectively. 5 These tradable tasks included IT ser-
vices, accounting, debt collection, tax processing, data collection, report writing, human
resource operations, and supply chain management. 86 Finally, the falsity of a north-south
flow in offshoring is further affirmed by the emergence of reshoring manufacturing and
services in recent years (albeit still nascent and small in relation to offshoring).87 Reshor-
ing occurs when the cost benefit for relocating to a low-cost country is commensurate to a
high-cost country. 8 The scale, skill, and productivity of workers in low-cost countries
have increasingly begun to reach similar levels to their high-cost counterparts8 9 For in-
stance, the rise in wages in middle and low-income countries in the past decade has begun
to erode labor cost advantages of offshoring.90 Other cost benefit factors, such as rising
transportation costs and technological advances, have prompted the shift towards reshor-
ing.91 With regard to manufacturing, a 2012 Hackett Group report predicted that off-
shoring from industrialized to developing countries will decline over the next two years,
while reshoring activities will double over the previous two years. 92 In the area of services,
a 2008 Wall Street Journal article observed that narrowing wage gaps between countries
and the decline in the U.S. dollar precipitated a shutdown of Indian back office IT opera-
tions by U.S. companies.93 Furthermore, concurrent to the emergence of reshoring is the
rising shift from low-cost to lower-cost countries, as the latter are now replacing the for-
mer in cost effectiveness.94 As such, emerging variations in the multi-directional flow of
offshoring further demonstrate that offshoring's actual and measurable impact is greater
efficient resource allocation across industries and countries, thereby expanding and shift-
ing the definition of what it means to benefit and incur costs from offshoring.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Coming Home: A Growing Number ofAmerican Companies are Moving their Manufacturing Back to the
United States, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2013, at 6, available at http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/
21569570-growing-number-american-companies-are-moving-their-manufacturing-back-united [hereinafter
Coming Home]; CHANG, Supra note 35, at 14.
88. See Coming Home, supra note 87.
89. See generally MICHEL JANSSEN, ERIK DORR & MARTIJN GEERLING, THE HACKETT GROUP, JOB
LOSSES FROM OFFSHORING AND PRODUCTIVITY WMPROVEMENTS FAR OUTPACE GAINS FROM EcoNomic
GROWTH (2012), available at http://www.thehackettgroup.com/research/2012/offshoring-update/hckt2Ol2-
offshoring-forecast.pdf.
90. Coming Home, supra note 87, at 5.
91. See id.; CHANo, supra note 35, at 14.
92. Coming Home, supra note 87, at 3; JANSSEN, DORR & GEERLING, supra note 89, at 1.
93. Jackie Range, Rethinking the India Back Office, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj
.con/article/SB 12026874443 7257531 .html.
94. See Press Release, The Hackett Group, Reshoring of Some Chinese Manufacturing Jobs Becoming
Likely as Cost Gap is Expected to Shrink to Just 16 Percent Next Year (May 24, 2012), available at http://
www.thehackettgroup.com/about/research-alerts-press-releases/2012/05242012-reshoring-some-chinese-
manufacturing-jobs.jsp.
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C. OFFSHORING AND INNOVATION: THE (ILLUSORY) BARRIER OF GEOGRAPHICAL
DISTRIBUTION
Overall, the above analysis indicates that the use of foreign inputs may lower costs,
allowing firms to expand output and employment and raise wages at the aggregate level. 95
In particular, the positive association between offshoring and productivity discussed ear-
lier warrants greater attention here, as innovation is one integral component of a firm's
ability to profit and grow.96 Detractors often argue that offshoring disrupts innovation
due to geographical distribution of workers, as physical proximity is required to foster the
high levels of communication and tactical knowledge from which innovation arises.97 The
analysis below will demonstrate that, contrary to this belief, offshoring is likely not a de-
terrent but both an enabler and byproduct of innovation. While the body of literature on
the association between offshoring and innovation is only beginning to develop, emerging
research in this area points to offshoring's positive effect on innovative activity.98 In 2008,
Gorg and Hanley released a forefront study that specifically addressed whether a firm's
services offshoring increased its rate of innovation.99 The study's use of firm-level data
from the Republic of Ireland from 2000 to 2004 is also noteworthy here, as offshoring
plays an even more significant role in Ireland's economy than in larger counterparts such
as the United States."oo Indeed, in comparison to the largest economies, Ireland repre-
sents one of many smaller countries where offshoring comprises a major share of its inter-
national trade. 10o Focusing on trade in services and using research and development
(R&D) expenditure as a proxy for innovation at the firm level, the analysis revealed that
offshoring offered greater opportunities for capitalizing on international factor cost differ-
ences, which resulted in increased profits and flexibility in altering production processes
towards innovation.102 Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the higher the rate of a
firm's innovation, the greater its ability to advance technologically and remain competi-
tive."' 3 This conclusion, in particular, addresses fears that offshoring's expansion from
manufacturing to services will result in "hollowing out" production in industrialized coun-
tries."o4 On the contrary, the analysis predicted that technological advances arising from
offshoring-enabled innovation ensure that a technological gap between developed and de-
veloping countries remains. 05
95. Hummels et al., supra note 63, at 21.
96. See generally Toni C. Langlinais & Marco A. Merino, Future Value and Innovation: How to Sustain Profita-
ble Growth OUTLOOK (Sept. 2007), http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/OutlookPDF
_FutureGrowth_03.pdf.
97. Collaborative Technologies, supra note 31, at 147 - 148.
98. See G6rg & Hanley, supra note 42, at 4, 19; see also BERNHARD DACHS & BERND EBERSBERGER, THE
EFFEcTs OF PRODUCTION OFFSHORING ON R&D AND INNOVATION IN THE HOME COUNTRY (2013),
available at http://www.fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Studien 2013_2014/01 DachsEbers
berger._ResearchReport.pdf.
99. G6rg & Hanley, supra note 42, at 4.
100. Id. at 10.
101. See PABLO AGNESE & JOAN ENRIc RICART, OFFSHORING: FACTS AND NUMBERS AT THE COUNTRY
LEVEL (2009), available at http://www.ub.edu/jei/papers/AGNESE-RICART.pdf.
102. G6rg & Hanley, supra note 42, at 5, 18 - 19.
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More recently, Dachs and Ebersberger, in a study released in 2013, affirmed the posi-
tive relationship between offshoring and innovation performance.106 There, data was de-
rived from a 2009 European Manufacturing Survey, a recurring survey that covers three
years of product, process, service, and organizational innovation of more than 3,000 man-
ufacturing companies in seven European countries. 07 Seeking specifically to explore off-
shoring's effect on a firm's R&D and product and process innovation in its home country,
the study found offshoring (1) pushes firms to invest in R&D, design, and process innova-
tion; (2) correlates with much higher levels of innovation input, such as R&D and design;
(3) increases the likelihood of product innovation at all degrees of the novelty spectrum;
and (4) positively affects process innovation by enabling greater investment in advanced
production technologies. 1o These findings not only undermine protectionist fears that
offshoring is symptomatic of a firm's inability to compete, but also point to its demon-
strated effectiveness in strengthening domestic technological capabilities and facilitating a
firm's international expansion.109
D. OFFsHORING & OPrIMAL PRODucTrVrry: THE (LIMITED) UTILrY OF FACE-TO-
FACE INTERACTION
Questionable assumptions related to offshoring and innovation also extend to offshor-
ing's impact on productivity. Just as with innovation, physical proximity is considered
vital to the transfer of tacit knowledge between workers."r0 In management practice, it
has been long perceived that physical separation of workers weakens the inter-personal
and inter-organizational collaboration needed for knowledge-intensive tasks; throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, this rationale served as the basis for the wide-spread practice of
placing cross-functional teams in one location (co-located teams)."' Recent research in
this area has reached the opposite conclusion, as advances in information technology have
now equipped geographically distributed teams (GDTs) with communications capabilities
that allow them to achieve equally effective, if not superior, results.112
For example, Gupta et al.'s 2009 comparison study of co-located teams and GDTs at
IBM over a one-year period revealed that geography has no effect on team outcomes.' 13
There, the two teams had the same number of individuals and technologies; they also
engaged in similar tasks and faced similar deadlines."4 These technologies included
email, instant messaging, and the same processes for managing tasks and source code.IIs
Using a dataset of interviews, observations of weekly meetings, and archival data, the
study found that both models experienced similar levels of collaboration." 6 In particular,
the GDT uniquely benefited from their dispersed working arrangement in the following
106. See generally, DACHS & EBERSBERGER, supra note 98.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id. at 31.
109. Id. at 32.
110. Collaborative Technologies, supra note 3 1, at 148.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 158.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 153.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 157.
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ways: (1) higher levels of documentation and history retention; (2) clear and concise com-
munication and distribution of work assignments and items; (3) twenty-four-hour worker
availability, thereby enabling resolution of time-sensitive, short-term tasks irrespective of
a location's work schedule; and (4) continuous engagement with tasks across time zones"17
These GDT-specific work processes merit greater attention, as they point to offshor-
ing's potential to significantly increase efficiency and productivity beyond current levels.
One proposed business practice model, put forth by one of the authors of this paper, is a
variant of a GDT structure known as the "24-Hour Knowledge Factory."'iS Under this
model, knowledge-based tasks are continuously performed for 24-hours by passing these
tasks from one worker to the next in different time zones. 1 9 The ongoing cycle involves a
worker putting in the appropriate hours for her time zone and transferring the task to
another worker whose workday is beginning in that time zone.120 Presently, the informa-
tion systems (IS) sector is applying this model for IS design, development, and implemen-
tation. 121 Participating software developers completed projects in a much shorter time
than their co-located counterparts.122 In particular, continuous focus on a given task in-
creased productivity because (1) mandatory testing and approvals took place overnight,
allowing software developers to continue work without delay; and (2) geographic distribu-
tion of work sites enabled hiring of talented designers who otherwise would be unavailable
due to their residency abroad or unwillingness to work nontraditional work hours.123
These promising results in the IS sector may be replicated in a broad range of functions
and industries engaged in knowledge-intensive tasks, including medical services, logistics
planning, financial analysis, and product design.124
Overall, the body of research points to offshoring's current and potential capabilities to
increase productivity and efficiency at individual firm and aggregate levels, with direct and
diffusive positive distributional effects on the labor market and society as a whole. While
costs are incurred at industry levels, particularly among low-skilled workers, empirical
evidence undermines the rationale behind the majority of protectionist fears. Further-
more, the positive associations between offshoring and socio-economic indicators dis-
cussed earlier demonstrate that anti-offshoring measures are an inappropriate mechanism
if one also seeks to increase economic growth and opportunities as part of the solution to
resolve offshoring's negative distributional effects.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 148.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Amar Gupta, Expanding the 24-Hour Workplace: Round-the-Clock Operations Aren't Just for Call Centers
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m. Anti-Offshoring Measures and the International Trade Regime:
Permissible and Impermissible Violations to the Letter and Spirit
of Trade Laws
The validity of anti-offshoring measures not only suffers from lack of empirical support
but also a strong legal basis justifying these actions. Enactment of anti-offshoring mea-
sures exposes governments to potential areas of legal non-compliance at national and in-
ternational levels as a result of their binding commitments to trade agreements. As a first
step to determining the legal legitimacy of these measures, it is instructive to discuss the
legal framework for the international trade regime. A review of the scope and nature of
the WTO agreements below, which have been signed by the majority of trading nations
and ratified by their legislatures, will serve as illustrative examples of the parameters and
exceptions under which member nations are allowed to operate.125 Just as importantly, it
should be noted that, although this analysis will underscore the observation that anti-
offshoring measures likely violate the spirit of these trade agreements, a case-by-case ex-
amination is required to determine whether a particular country is legally authorized to
pursue any measure that is inconsistent with these agreements' provisions.
The WTO describes itself as "an organization for trade opening," at the crux of which
are trade agreements with an "overriding purpose ... to help trade flow as freely as possi-
ble-so long as there are no undesirable side effects-because this is important for eco-
nomic development and well-being."126 Several WTO agreements establish the ground
rules for trade between nations, with the objective of reducing trade barriers and increas-
ing market access.127 As this paper pertains to offshoring, we will only focus on the fol-
lowing relevant agreements: (1) the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),
which applies to goods, and (2) the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).128
In keeping with the WTO's spirit of advancing trade liberalization, these agreements
are designed to foster the core principle of nondiscrimination among WTO members and
between foreign and domestic suppliers of goods and services.129 This tenet is expressed
under the following articles: (1) most favored nation (MFN) treatment (GATS, Article II;
GATT, Article I); and (2) national treatment (GATS Article XVII; GATT Article 111).'30
MFN treatment means that all trading partners must be treated equally, such that any
policies or changes to trade terms or market access applies to goods and services from all
trading partners.' 3' Correspondingly, national treatment demands equal treatment of for-
125. What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/whatis~e
.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
126. Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis-e/who-we-are-e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
127. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatise/til e/agrml_e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
128. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1l, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IB, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/does e/legal-e/26-gats _e.htm [hereinafter GATS].
129. Understanding the WTO: Basics- Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto
.org/english/thewto e/whatis_.e/tif-e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
130. Id.
131. GATS, supra note 128, art. II; GATT, suipra note 128, art. I.
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eign and domestic goods and services once these imports enter the market.132 The 1994
Uruguay Round establishing the umbrella VTO Agreement, which covers goods
(GATT) and services (GATS), requires member adherence to "the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided." 23 This
means that these commitments have broad application to laws directly related to trade and
any indirect measure that violates these commitments.134 These direct and indirect ac-
tions pertain to measures at all levels of a member nation's government structure. 35
Notwithstanding the necessity of these bedrock principles to fulfill these agreements'
goals, member nations may discriminate under certain exceptions. These exceptions are
expressly stipulated in the agreement in question and/or specific to a particular nation's
terms upon becoming a signatory to the agreement. With respect to WTO agreements'
sanctioned exceptions, discriminatory treatment is only permissible under the following
conditions:
* Balance of Payments (GATT, Articles XII and XVIII:B; GATS, Article XI): This
applies when a member nation has an unsustainable current account that threatens to
become a crisis (e.g., the current account is in deficit and the net imports of goods
and services cannot be financed with sufficient inflow of foreign capital or a reduction
in foreign reserves);' 36
* Developing Nations (GATT, Article XIV; GATS Article V): Developing countries
may have additional time to comply with certain commitments, or be exempted from
trade remedy proceedings if the volume of their exports of the affected product to the
importing state is small;137
* National Security (GATT, Article XXI; GATS Article XIV bis.): Members may dis-
criminate on security grounds, including withholding information essential to secur-
ity interests and taking any actions for protection of security interests;'38
* General Exceptions (GATT, Article XX): With respect to trade in goods, barring
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, member nations may adopt measures:
"(a) necessary to protect public morals (or maintain public order);
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs en-
forcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II
and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the pre-
vention of deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labor;
132. GATS,supra note 128, art. XVII, GATT, supra note 128, art. m.
133. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. V 4, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
134. ELLIOrr SCH. OF Iwr'L AFFAIRS, A THREE-YEAR REVIEW OF THE WTO (Steve Suranovic ed., 1998),
available at http://internationalecon.com/wto/wto-toc.php.
135. Id.
136. GATT, supra note 128, arts. XII, XVIII:B; GATS, supra note 128, art. XII.
137. GATT, supra note 128, art. XIV; GATS, supra note 128, art. V.
138. GATT, supra note 128, art. XXI; GATS, supra note 128, art. XIV bis.
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(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeo-
logical value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption;
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity
agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the contracting parties and not
disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved." 39
General Exceptions (GATS, Article XIV): With respect to trade in services, barring
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, member nations may adopt measures:
"(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects
of a default on services contracts;
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual
records and accounts;
(iii) safety;
(d) inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in treatment is aimed
at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in re-
spect of services or service suppliers of other Members;
(e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment is the result
of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance
of double taxation in any other international agreement or arrangement by which the
Member is bound."140
While the economic circumstances and rationales related to anti-offshoring measures
discussed earlier are not tied to any of these conditions that would authorize an exception,
anti-offshoring measures related to personal data protection introduced in the next section
implicate GATS Article XIV(c)(ii) above and will be analyzed therein.141
Next, whether anti-offshoring measures violate a member nation's commitments to
WTO agreements also depends on qualifying terms and/or conditions that may attach to
a nation's entry into these agreements. For instance, GATS currently contains ninety-five
schedules of specific commitments in services and sixty-one lists of MFN exemptions.1 42
To determine the extent and conditions under which GATS-market access rules, national
treatment, and MFN treatment apply within a member nation's jurisdiction, one must
examine that nation's schedule of covered services and any applicable MFN exemp-
tions.143 Additionally, the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) must
139. GATT, supra note 128, art. XX.
140. GATS,supra note 128, art. XIV.
141. GATS, supra note 128, art. XIV(c)(ii).
142. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules ofSpecific Commitments and the List ofArticle II (MFN) Eremptions,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/guidel-e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
143. Id.
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be considered with respect to anti-offshoring restrictions on government agency procure-
ment of goods and services because, similar to GATS, these agencies must be listed on a
member nation's schedule in order to be bound to WTO commitments.'44 The section
below will apply this international legal framework of binding obligations, exceptions, and
allowance for country-specific terms and conditions to evaluate the legitimacy of anti-
offshoring measures in the following member nation and nation-group case studies.
IV. The Questionable Legality of Anti-Offshoring Measures at National
and International Levels: A Review of Selected Countries Across the
Globe
While the nature and scope of WTO commitments and exceptions indicate that anti-
offshoring measures are inconsistent with these commitments, an examination of the in-
terplay between trade laws and anti-offshoring laws at individual country and regional
levels is instructive to reveal the complexity and extent to which anti-offshoring laws un-
dermine both the sovereignty of national and international legal systems. First, this sec-
tion will analyze the United States as a prime example of how nations with a federal
system of governance may violate its own constitution and international obligations. Sec-
ond, this section will review anti-offshoring measures across the globe, with a focus on the
EU and other nations that have adopted anti-offshoring measures packaged as personal
data protections. Just as with the United States, the EU and other nations may violate
their WTO commitments through enactment of these measures. Just as importantly, the
suitability of anti-offshoring mechanisms is called into doubt to address the valid public
policy concern of data protection, as authorized under GATS Article XIV(c)(ii).145
A. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF ANTI-OFFSHORING LAWS IN THE US: POTENTIAL
VIOLATIONS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS
The U.S. employs a federal system that recognizes the dual sovereignty of both its
national and state governments, but state actions may not undermine or conflict with the
federal government's right to create and maintain a uniform foreign policy in interstate
commerce and dealings with other nations.146 In correspondence with rising anti-offshor-
ing sentiments in the past decade, described earlier in this paper, state legislators across
the nation have been advancing anti-offshoring measures, with varying degrees of fre-
quency and extremes.'47 This ongoing pattern of politicians attempting to pass restrictive
144. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 33 I.L.M. 1125, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs -elegal
e/gpr-9401._e.htm [hereinafter GPA].
145. GATS, supra note 128, art. XIV(c)(ii).
146. See KLINGER & SYKEs, supra note 24, at 2-7.
147. NAT'L FouND. FOR AMERICAN POLICY, AN-n-OtrrSOURCING EFFORTS DowN Brr Nor Our 2-7
(2007), available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/04070utsourcingBrief.pdf [hereinafter Awri-OUTSOURCING
EFFORTS].
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legislation continues and tends to become heightened in election years; only a fraction of
the bills turn into law.148
Table I provides examples of pending U.S. state bills and laws.
State and Summary of Bill or Legislation Bill Number
Massachusetts: The state purchasing agent shall give preference, as H2804
far as may be practicable and to the extent permitted by the General (introduced
Laws, federal law, and federal treaty, to products or services 2013)149
manufactured or produced in the United States
New York: Requires employers to provide notice of outsourcing of 502992
jobs prior to such outsourcing; bars governmental agencies from (introduced
engaging in the practice of outsourcing jobs; requires consumer 2013)150
awareness and consent for disclosure of nonpublic personal
information to nonaffiliated third parties; requires legislative
ratification of procurement contracts between the state, through the
governor, and any multinational trade organization or corporation
North Carolina: Under the Sustainable Energy-Efficient Buildings House Bill 628/
Program, a major facility construction or renovation project may S.L. 2013-242
utilize a building rating system so long as the rating system (i) (enacted
provides certification credits for, (ii) provides a preference to be 2013)151
given to, (iii) does not disadvantage, and (iv) promotes building
materials or furnishings, including masonry, concrete, steel, textiles,
or wood that are manufactured or produced within the state
NewYork: Controls the closure of call centers by public utilities in A7593 / S4208
the state by requiring a hearing before the Public Service (enacted
Commission when a public utility proposes to close or relocate an 2010)152
existing call center out of state
Colorado: Restricts state agencies from buying goods or services Senate Bill 228
outside the United States (enacted
2007)153
Hawaii: Bars state officials from binding state to government House Bill 30
procurement rules in international trade agreements without (enacted
legislative action 2007)154
New Hampshire: Establishes a commission to oversee and Senate Bill 162
negotiate issues relative to the North American Free Trade (enacted
Agreement and the World Trade Organization 2007)155
North Carolina: Restrictions on call center operations Senate Bill 514
(enacted
2007)156
148. Id. at 4-5.
149. H.R. 2804, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013).
150. S. 02992, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
151. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 242.
152. S. 7593, 2009 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010).
153. S. 228, 66th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007).
154. H. R. 30, 24th Leg., Ist Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2007).
155. S. 162, 2007 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2007).
156. 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 514.
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Californi : Requires vendors awarded contracts over $100,000 to Assembly Bill
disclose if work will be performed outside the United States 1172 (enacted
2006)157
Rhode Island: Requires General Assembly to enact legislation to House Bill 6885
explicitly authorize Governor to commit the state's procurement / Senate Bill
rules to be bound by a particular trade agreement 2331 (enacted
2006)158
Vennmont Set up commission for conducting annual assessments on House Bill 109
impact of international trade agreements (enacted
2006)15
California: Prohibits sending voter data collected in referendums or Assembly Bill
initiatives outside the United States 1741 (enacted
2005)160
Colorado: In-state preference for agricultural products House Bill 1741
(enacted
2005)161
Illinois: Expands preferences for products manufactured in the Senate Bill 1723
United States (enacted
2005)162
Maine: Original version would have banned state contracts with LD 471 / HP
companies that outsource work overseas; Bill was amended to a 346 (enacted
study 2005)163
Marland: Prohibits state officials from binding state to House Bill 514
government procurement rules of international trade agreements; (enacted
Companion is Senate Bill 401 2005)164
New Tersey: Prohibits state contract work from being performed Senate Bill 494
outside the United States (enacted
2005)165
North Carolina: Contractors must disclose where work on state House Bill 800
contracts will be performed, which affects evaluation of bid (enacted
2005)166
North Dakota: Gives preference to state bidders when two bids House Bill 1091
receive same evaluation scores (enacted
2005)167
157. Assemb. 1172, 2005-2006 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
158. H. R. 6885, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (RI. 2006).
159. H. R. 549, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2006).
160. Assemb. 1741, 2005-2006 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
161. 2005 Colo. Sess. Laws 1307.
162. S. 1723, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2005 Sess. (Ill. 2005).
163. Legis. Doc. 471, 122d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Me. 2005).
164. H. R. 514, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005).
165. S. 494, 211th Leg., 2004 Sess. (NJ. 2005).
166. H. R. 800, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
167. H. R. 1091, 59th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2005).
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Alabama: Encourages state and local entities to use state-based Senate Joint
professional services but does not restrict or place mandates on Resolution 63
procurement decisions (enacted
2004)168
Colorado: Agencies can contract for personal services performed House Bill 1373
outside of the United States if (1) it is clearly demonstrated that (enacted
there will be no reduction in the quality of services offered and (2) 2004)169
contracts contain confidentiality and right to privacy safeguards
Indiana: Provides for price preferences between 1 and 5 percent for House Bill 1080
Indiana companies in awarding state contracts (enacted
2004)170
New lersey: Requires state grants for customized employee Senate Bill 1452
training to be returned if jobs for which training was provided are (enacted
outsourced out of state 2004)171
North Carolina: Forbids state contracts for telemarketing or call Senate Bill 991
service centers with any company that (1) does not perform work in (enacted
the United States and (2) fails to solely employ individuals 2004)172
authorized to work in the United States
Tennessee: Requires the Commissioner of Finance and Senate Bill 2344
administration to authorize through regulation a preference for state (enacted
contract bids that employ U.S. citizens residing in the United States 2004)173
to perform data entry and/or call center services
Ltah: Funding $40,000 for a smart site program aimed at Senate Bill 109
supporting local businesses in providing services that might (enacted
otherwise be performed by state agencies by outsourcing 2004)174
Pennsylvania: Provides tax credits for call centers physically located House Bill 200
in state that employ at least 150 people for the purpose of answering (enacted
phones 2003)175
As the table demonstrates, these anti-offshoring measures vary in application and ex-
tremity. One popular action involves government procurement restrictions on overseas
goods and services. These include: requiring work be performed on U.S. soil or author-
ized U.S. workers perform the work in-state 76 or U.S.-based "preferences" that give do-
mestic goods and services preferential treatment;' 7 7 instructing bids by vendors to disclose
the site of contract performance; or establishing committees and/or studies on offshoring
reduction strategies.'78 Another popular measure targets firms through regulation of call
168. S. J. Res. 63, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2004).
169. H. R. 1373, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004).
170. H. Enrolled Act 1080, 113th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2004).
171. S. 1452, 211th Leg., 2004 Sess. (NJ. 2004).
172. S. 991, 2004 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004).
173. S. 2344, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2004).
174. S. 199, 2004 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004).
175. H. R. 200, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003).
176. KLINGER & SYKES, supra note 24, at 4.
177. Id. at 11.
178. ANTn-OuTSOURCING EFFORTS, supra note 147, at 2-7.
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centers abroad, personal data transfer requirements, and ineligibility for government
benefits. 79
Regardless of the nature and scope of these actions, anti-offshoring laws arguably inter-
fere with the federal government's ability to maintain a uniform foreign policy and may
violate the Federal Constitution on one or more of the following grounds: the supremacy
of federal law over state law in exclusive and/or traditional areas of concern (the Doctrine
of Preemption), state interference with foreign affairs (the Federal Foreign Affairs Power),
and state interference with Congressional authority to regulate commerce with foreign
nations (the Federal Commerce Power).18 The culmination of U.S. Supreme Court ju-
risprudence prohibits state actions that (1) involve areas of exclusive and/or traditional
federal concern, which includes foreign affairs, and/or (2) frustrate the objectives of Con-
gress, federal laws, and treaties.' 8 In matters implicating parties and activities overseas,
the Court has applied one or a combination of the above constitutional principles as the
legal underpinnings for their decisions.182
While the Court has yet to specifically address the legality of state anti-offshoring ac-
tions, case law addressing similar issues points to a finding of constitutional violations. 8 3
For instance, in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court invoked the Doctrine of Preemption to
invalidate Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act because the state's measure had an impact
on foreign affairs and conflicted with a federal scheme of regulation that provided a stan-
dard for the registration of aliens.184 In discussing the state's impact on foreign affairs, the
Court noted that,
it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects international rela-
tions, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally
conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. Any concurrent state
power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits. 85
With regards to the state regulation conflicting with federal regulation, the Court rea-
soned that not only did such a conflict violate the Supremacy Clause, but also added that
179. Id.
180. KLINGER & SYKES, supra note 24, at 2. For detailed legal analysis on the constitutionality of anti-
offshoring measures, see Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, United States Federalism and Anti-Offihoring Legislation:
The Constitutionality of Federal and State Measures Against Global Outsourcing of Professional Services, 44 TEX.
INr'L L.J. 629 (2009).
181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 - 73 (2000).
182. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (maintaining that the validity of state laws implicating
federal concerns turns upon whether the law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress"); Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003)
("There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign
relations must yield to the National Government's policy, given the 'concern for uniformity in this country's
dealings with foreign nations' that animated the Constitution's allocation of the foreign relations power to the
National Government in the first place.'") (quoting Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25); Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 74 (1st Cit. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited Hines for
the proposition that an 'Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."').
183. See, e.g., Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d at 74; Am. Ins. Assoc., 539 U.S. at
413.
184. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67.
185. Id. at 68.
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state actions will likely be invalid in the absence of conflict between federal and state laws
if they impede congressional objectives.186 Whether or not a state action poses a sufficient
barrier "is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a
whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects."187
Here, state anti-offshoring measures clearly touch upon foreign affairs, an area of fed-
eral concern. Furthermore, these measures likely prevent Congress from achieving its
trade liberalization and global market access objectives, as evidenced by U.S. membership
in and congressional ratification of WTO agreements. As the Hines Court's reasoning
above indicates, this conclusion still likely holds in the absence of existing federal laws that
directly address the anti-offshoring action in question.188 It is realistic to envision both
scenarios here, due to the plethora and differences in types of anti-shoring measures and
federal enactment of various trade agreements.
Additionally, while congressional objectives and statutes may trump state anti-offshor-
ing legislation, it is also important to note that states may have possible defenses against
this constitutional challenge. The inherent ambiguity and exceptions expressed in federal
statutes and trade agreements (as discussed earlier) may allow certain state actions to with-
stand constitutional challenges, as they indicate congressional acquiescence or endorse-
ment of state laws regulating certain aspects of professional services.' 8 9
In addition to the potential for state anti-offshoring actions to violate Federal Constitu-
tional provisions, anti-offshoring actions by Congress also likely place the federal govern-
ment in violation of international obligations. Similar to their state counterparts, federal
legislators have and continue to propose numerous anti-offshoring bills that would under-
cut the nation's commitments to trade agreements if enacted.190 The following bills re-
present a brief summary of offshoring initiatives currently before Congress (2013):
* Stop Outsourcing and Create American Jobs Act (H.R. 2740), which imposes increased
penalties for tax evasion practices in haven countries that ship U.S. jobs overseas and
for other purposes;'91
* Bring Yobs Home Act (H.R. 851), which amends the Internal Revenue Code, encour-
ages domestic insourcing and discourages foreign outsourcing;192
* American Jobs Matter Act (S. 1246), which requires contracting officers to consider
information regarding domestic employment before awarding a federal defense con-
tract and for other purposes;193
186. See id. at 66.
187. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
188. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 68.
189. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (providing states with the ability to enact provisions, including
restrictions, that fall within the allowed exceptions and reservations).
190. See e.g., United States Call Center Worker and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 2909, 113th Cong.
(2013); Bring Jobs Home Act, H.R. 851, 113th Cong. (2013); Outsourcing Accountability Act, H.R. 790,
113th Cong. (2013); United States Call Center Worker and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 2909, 113th
Cong. (2013).
191. Stop Outsourcing and Create American Jobs Act, H.R. 2740, 113th Cong. (2013).
192. H.R. 851.
193. American Jobs Matter Act, S. 1246, 113th Cong. (2013).
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* Outsourcing Accountability Act (H.R. 790), which requires the disclosure of the total
number of a company's domestic and foreign employees;194 and
* United States Call Center Worker and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 2909), which re-
quires the Secretary of Labor to maintain a publicly available list of all employers that
relocate a call center overseas, to make such companies ineligible for federal grants or
guaranteed loans, and to require disclosure of the physical location of business agents
engaging in customer service communications and for other purposes.195
Notwithstanding the high popularity and political capital of these bills, Congress has
thus far only enacted one such measure. The Thomas-Voinovich Amendment (TVA) was
ratified in 2004 and operated as a temporary amendment on 2004 appropriations that
barred all executive agency work from being performed by contractors abroad.196 The
application of the TVA required domestic and foreign businesses seeking federal govern-
ment contracts to use domestic workers to perform the contract work.197
Just as with state anti-offshoring measures, federal actions in this area likely violate the
nation's commitments to international trade agreements. Federal contract restrictions,
such as the TVA's U.S. worker requirement for 2004 appropriations, break the federal
government's pledge to extend equal treatment to domestic and foreign entities under the
GPA.198 Even though the TVA applied to both domestic and foreign companies, foreign
companies faced potentially greater transactions costs (e.g., relocation expenses) and do-
mestic companies already offshoring would have to shift production processes to qualify
for these bids.199
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that exceptions and defenses may also be suc-
cessfully raised. For instance, federal contract restrictions on site and worker require-
ments may potentially withstand GPA violations because the U.S. inclusion of Annex I to
the GPA does not bind all federal agencies to the agreement. 200 Other loopholes include
provisions in federal statutes ratifying the trade agreement in question, which empowers
U.S. laws with pre-emptory effect in the event of conflict. 201 Furthermore, where there is
a conflict between a federal statute and federal treaty, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that
the "one last in date will control."202
194. H.R. 790.
195. H.R. 2909.
196. Consolidations Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 647(e), 118 Stat. 3.
197. KLINGER & SYKEs, supra note 24, at 19-20.
198. SHANNON KLINGER & M. LYNN SYKEs, ExPORTING THE LAw: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL OUTrsOURCING LEGISLATION 19 (2004), available at http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/stud
ies/NFAPStudyExportingLaw_-0404.pdf.
199. Id.
200. See GPA, supra note 144, Annex 1(1)-(5), available at http://www.wto.org/engish/tratop-e/gproc-e/
appendices-e.htm#taipei (omitting agencies not bound).
201. E.g., 19 U.S.C.A. § 3512(a)(1) (West 2013).
202. Wbitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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B. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF ANTr-OFFSHORING LAWS ACROSS THE GLOBE: THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF ANTI-OFFSHORING MEASURES To RESOLVE PUBLIC
POLICY CONCERNS ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
In addition to the United States, countries around the world have proposed and/or
implemented various anti-offshoring initiatives. One of the most globally popular and
controversial measures involves laws aimed at protecting the privacy of personal data.
This type of legislation in particular warrants greater examination, as it not only echoes
the United States' quandary of legal repercussions on a global level but also introduces
public policy concerns and whether anti-offshoring measures are a suitable solution. In-
deed, offshoring within certain industries necessitates the transfer of a consumer's medi-
cal, personal, or financial information, prompting concerns that such data may be misused
or stolen. 203 The GATS General Exception Article XTV(c)(ii) (discussed earlier) allows for
personal data transfer restrictions, provided they are "not arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
trade in services." 204 A case study of the EU's construction and application of these per-
sonal data protection measures, however, brings into question whether valid public policy
or protectionist goals are achieved.
First, it is useful to recognize the understandable global concern and motivation behind
measures aimed at personal data protection. Major incidents involving compromise of
large amounts of personal data are listed in Table II below:
Data Breach Number
Nation Company Description Year Affected
U.S. Epsilon The world's largest 2011 40
provider of permission- billion205
based email marketing
suffered a huge data
breach; Hackers may
have swiped customer
data belonging to the
world's biggest brands
China Shanghai Roadway D&B Company allegedly 2012 150
Marketing Services illegally bought and sold million 206
customer information
U.S. Heartland Payment Malicious software/hack 2009 130
Systems, Tower Federal compromises unknown million207
Credit Union, Beverly number of credit cards at
National Bank fifth largest credit card
processor
203. See ANTri-OLTSOURCING EFFORTS, supra note 147, at 7-8.
204. GATS, supra note 128, art. XIV.
205. Taylor Arnerding, The 15 Worst Data Security Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO ONuNE (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.csoonline.corn/article/700263/the-15-worst-data-security-breaches-of-the-21st-century.
206. Largest Data Loss Incidents, DATALossDB.ORG, http://datalossdb.org/index/largest (last visited Jan. 8,
2014).
207. Id.
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U.S. TJX Companies Credit card numbers and 2007 94
transaction details million 208
compromised
U.S. TRW, Sears Roebuck Hackers accessed credit- 1984 90
reporting database million 209
U.S. Sony Corporation Names, addresses, email 2011 77







U.S. CardSystems, Visa, Major card processor 2004 40
MasterCard, American breached million2"l
Express
China Tianya Forum members' 2011 40
usernames and clear-text million 212
passwords leaked online
by hackers
Korea SK Communications, Names, email addresses, 2011 35





U.S. Steam (Valve, Inc.) User names, passwords, 2011 35




U.S. RockYou Inc. User names and 2009 32
passwords million 215
U.S. U.S. Department of Names, Social Security 2006 26.5
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Great HM Revenue, Customs, Two missing CDs with 2007 25
Britain TNT addresses, dates of birth, million 217
and National Insurance
numbers of the entire
HMRC child benefit
database as well as 7
million banking details
compromised
U.S. Zappos Email addresses, billing 2012 24
and shipping addresses, million 218
phone numbers, the last
four digits from credit
cards, and passwords
compromised
China 7k7k Data for game site users 2011 20
compromised million219
U.S. Care2 Forced password reset 2011 18
million 220
Germany T-Mobile, Deutsche Customer data 2008 17
Telekom compromised million221
Korea Nexon Korea Corp Names, usernames, 2011 13




U.S. Bank of New York Back-up tape of BNY 2008 12.5






217. Patrick Wintour, Lost in the Post-25 Million at Risk After Data Discs Go Missing, THE GUARDIAN, NOV.
20, 2007, at 1 available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/nov/21/immigrationpolicy.economy3.
218. David Goldman, Zappos Hacked, 24 Million Accounts Accessed, CNN MONEY (Jan. 16, 2012, 11:33 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/16/technology/zapposhack/.
219. C. Custer, Hackers Steal Data ofMillions ofChinese Net Users, TECH LN ASIA (Dec. 22, 2011, 2:43 PM),
http://www.techinasia.com/hackers-steal-data-of-millions-of-chinese-net-users/.
220. Care2 Acknowledges Security Breach, ESECURITY PLANET (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.esecurityplanet
.com/network-security/care2-acknowledges-security-breach.htnl.
221. Telekom Says Data From 17 Million Customers was Stolen, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 10, 2008), http://
www.dw.de/telekom-says-data-from-17-million-customers-was-stolen/a-3690132-1.
222. Sung-won Shim, Data of 13 Million South Korean Online Game Subscribers Hacked, REUTERS (Nov. 26,
2011, 6:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/26/us-korea-hacking-nexon-
idUSTRE7APO9H20111126.
223. Jonathan Stempel, Bank ofNYMellon Data Breach Now Affects 12.5 Mn, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2008, 4:00
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/28/bankofnymellon-breach-idUSWNAB863220080828.
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Canada Canada Revenue Agency Vital records of 1985 1986 16
Canadian taxpayers was million224
stolen from Toronto's
District Taxation Center
Countries that have enacted laws related to personal data transfers include Argentina,
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mex-
ico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Poland, Portu-
gal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland,
Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Vietnam. 225 And just as with the indi-
vidual states within the United States, several sub-national governments have also passed
similar legislation. For instance, the Chinese province of Jiangsu, where many foreign
manufacturing joint ventures are located, enacted the 2012 Regulation of Information
Technology of Jiangsu Province, an ordinance requiring consent or official approval for
data transfers outside the state.226
Additionally, a number of countries are currently considering personal data transfer
proposals. For example, the Australian Parliament is involved in an ongoing review of the
following bill: "Keeping Jobs from Going Offshore (Protection of Personal Information)
Bill," which continues to be re-introduced in subsequent sessions.227 The very name of
the bill points to the intent of restricting offshoring on the basis of protecting personal
information. 228 "The proposed legislation specifically targets the offshoring of customer
service operations to locations such as India and the Philippines. If approved, it will create
a number of obstacles for organizations that are having some or all of their business
processes handled overseas." 229
While the magnitude and occurrence of personal data breaches has and can take place
anywhere in the world, and warrants justifiable public policy concerns, a closer examina-
tion of several of these anti-offshoring measures reveals that their effect does more to
224. JOHN R. VACCA, COMPUTER AND LNFORAIATION SECURITY HANDBOOK 741 (Newnes, 2nd ed. 2012).
225. International Privacy Laws, INFORMATION SHIELD, http://www.informationshield.con/intprivacylaws
.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014); see generally DLA PIPER, DATA PROTEcTION LAWS OF THE WORLD (Cam-
eron Craig et al. eds., 2012), available at http://infonnation.dla.com/information/published/DPLaw World
Handbook 2012.pdf.
226. SpeechlyBircham, Information Law Up-date, SPEECHLYS.COM, 22 (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.speechlys
.com/media/I 58882/2013-02-12_- information-lawup-datewebinar_21_feb_2013_eyl_1 4 29 3 7 3 3_1.pdf;
Michael Standaert, Jiangsu Province Rules May Be 'Milestone' For Privacy Trend in China, Attorney Says, BNA




227. Keeping Jobs fron Going Offshore (Protection of Personal Information) Bill 2009 [2010], PARLIAMENT OF
AUSTRALIA, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary-Business/BillsLegislation/Bills SearchResults/Result?
bld=s734 (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
228. See Keeping Jobs from Going Offshore (Protection of Personal Information) Bill 200 (Cth) (Austl.),
available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.aulparllnfo/download/legislation/bills/s734_first/toc pdf/0921320.pdf;file
Type=application%2Fpdf.
229. Australian BPO Indusrny Responds to Anti-Offshoring Legislation, THE SAUCE (ul. 20, 2010), http://
thesauce.net.au/austraian-bpo-industry-responds-to-anti-offshoring-legislation/.
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discriminate between domestic and foreign providers than anything else. Frequently, the
standards imposed for the transfer, processing, and use of data beyond the particular
country or region (such as the EU) are more stringent than the standards for such transfer,
processing, and use of data and information within that country or region. 230 For exam-
ple, the 1995 Data Protection Directive of the European Union (Directive) specifies that
the transfer of personal information of EU citizens to a third country can take place if the
third country meets the data adequacy norms of the EU.231 This means that, unlike EU-
based providers, foreign-based providers who engage in data transfers to non-EU coun-
tries are subject to formal, complicated, and bureaucratic processes that involve, among
other things, establishment and documentation of transfer procedures and development
and implementation of appropriate compliance tools. 232
In case the third country does not meet the norms of EU, the Directive offers a set of
derogations enabling data transfer that include the mechanisms of Binding Corporate
Rules (BCR) and Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs). 233 This increases the compliance
costs for companies in these countries and places these companies at a disadvantage as
compared to companies located within the EU. Furthermore, while the Directive estab-
lishes common EU principles for information privacy, Member States interpret these
principles differently and consequently enacted a patchwork of legislation with varying
requirements. 234 For instance, Germany's consent laws are stricter than the Directive
guidelines. 235
While revisions were proposed to the Directive in early 2012, these revisions do not
directly address this issue. 236 Rather than confronting discriminatory issues such as
stricter standards and administrative burdens imposed on foreign firms, the Consultative
Committee proposed a "General Data Protection Regulation" (EU Data Regulation) that
included, among other recommendations, maintenance of adequate levels of protection
and implementation of standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules.237 In
230. See e.g., Philip Urofsky & Grace Harbour, Internal Investigations & Oversight Corporate Communications,
2 BLOOMBERc LAW REPORTS 19, 20-24 (2009), available at http-//www.shearman.com/files/Publication/
7cc68adc-67dc-4fc4-a497-d2634d939789/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/16d7dOca-10d9-4001-82al-
93964c50fl5b/LT-092209-US-Internal-Investigations-and-Foreign-Data-Protection-Laws.pdf; Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. LJ. 881, 895 (2013).
231. Council Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, art. 2 5(1), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF.
232. Lucas Bergkamp, EU Data Protection Polity- The Privacy Fallacy: Adverse Effects Of Europe's Data Protec-
tion Policy In An Information-Driven Economy, 18 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 31, 38 (2002).
233. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 231, art. 26(2), 26(4). Commission Decisions 2001/497/EC
and 2004/915/EC apply to transfers from data controllers to data controllers. See Commission Decision
2001/497, 2001 OJ. (L181) 19 (EC); Commission Decision 2004/915, 2004 O.J. (L385) 74 (EC); Commis-
sion Decision 2010/87/EU (formerly, 2002/16/EC) applies to transfers from data controllers to data proces-
sors. See Commission Decision 2010/87, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5 (EU).
234. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 231, art. 32; Urofsky & Harbour, supra note 230, at 21.
235. Urofsky & Harbour, supra note 230, at 21.
236. The Consultative Comm. of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data, Council of Eur., Proposals of Modernisation, T-PD_2014_04_rev4_E, 2
(Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotectionffPDdocumentsff-
PD(2012)04Rev4_E.Proposals%20of/o20modernisation(FINAL).pdf.
237. Id. at 6-7.
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fact, it has been argued that some of these proposed measures will increase transaction
costs. 238 One such proposal vests the data protection authority in each Member State,
with the authority to impose fines of up to 2 percent of the worldwide gross revenue of the
company that is found to be deficient in complying with the data privacy provisions. 239
The situation is further complicated by the fact that some data protection authorities are
subject to freedom of information legislation of their respective countries and information
submitted by companies as part of their applications for BCR authorization can be poten-
tially made available to others. 240 This again places the foreign companies at a competi-
tive disadvantage in comparison to domestic companies.
In its finalized version (ratification of which has been postponed until later this year),
the EU Data Regulation seeks to lower compliance costs by mandating uniform rules for
all Member States and increasing the number of ways businesses may demonstrate com-
pliance with EU standards. 241 Other current corrective measures have limited or ques-
tionable effect. For instance, it is instructive to consider EU actions taken with respect to
its determination that the United States does not meet the data adequacy standards of the
EU.242 A separate agreement, known as the "Safe Harbor," was negotiated and signed
between the EU and the United States to allow transfer of data without imposing major
overheads on U.S. companies. 243 Enforcement of this agreement, however, has been criti-
cized for being more stringent than enforcement under the Directive. 244
Furthermore, the increase in and creation of new market entry barriers towards U.S.
firms in particular indicates that the Directive is motivated by protectionist motives. 245
This is so because, unlike EU firms, U.S. counterparts are more advanced users of infor-
mation and need access to consumer data required for targeted marketing. 246 As such,
U.S. firms engaging in services such as direct marketing and consumer credit are at a
distinct disadvantage with respect to their EU competitors.247 While a few of these pro-
238. E.g., Ulrich Biumer & Stephanie Ostermann, New EU Data Protection Regulation to Affect Data Protec-
tion Act, INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFICE (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.intemationallawoffice.com/newsletters/
detail.aspx?g-476507af-d583-4fl0-9857-f5d82c64439a.
239. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Comm'n Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to
Increase Users' Control of their Data and to Cut Costs for Bus. (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-releaseIP-12-46_en.htm.




241. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, The Data Protection Reform- One Year On (Jan. 28. 2013) (available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-39._en.htm);Jorg Walter, Vote on EU Data Protection Regula-
tion Again Postponed, INSIDE PRIVACY (June 21, 2013), http://www.insideprivacy.com/international/vote-on-
eu-data-protection-regulation-again-postponed/; Monika Kuschewsky, EU Parliament's Lead Committee Will
Vote on EU Data Protection Regulation in October, INsIDEPRIvAcy (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.insideprivacy
.com/eu-parliaments-lead-committee-will-vote-on-eu-data-protection-regulation-in-october/.
242. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy And Technology: The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn To Institutions And
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1966, 1979 (2013).
243. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, ExpoRT.Gov, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg-main_018476.asp
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
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posed measures, such as implementation of a uniform policy, will help to lessen adminis-
trative costs of compliance to some degree, greater reform measures are still needed to
eliminate the discriminatory effect of current standards and procedures. 248
The findings that the Directive discriminates against foreign suppliers and creates an
obstacle to trade are clearly in violation of GATS principles of market access, MFN treat-
ment and national treatment, the relevant WTO agreement in this matter, and the agree-
ment in which the EU claims membership (in addition to individual membership held by
several EU Member States). 249 To determine whether such discrimination is valid under
the relevant GATS exception, Article XTV(c)(ii), which permits actions that ensure "the
protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of
personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts," so
long as they are not "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services." 250 Before begin-
ning the determination, it is important to stress once again that GATS utilizes a positive-
list approach to services coverage, so that it is necessary to first ascertain whether the
service in question is subject to GATS commitments and is excluded from the MFN ex-
emption list. 251 Here, the Directive implicates any number of services that involve the
flow of personal data, including but not limited to data processing, "human resources
information management, e-commerce operations, advertising services, market research
and public opinion polling services, etc. . . . ."252 In the interest of streamlining the analy-
sis and demonstrating that anti-offshoring measures of this nature are, in fact, a "disguised
restriction" on trade in services and violate the spirit of WTO agreements notwithstand-
ing GATS exceptions, this hypothetical exercise will assume EU blanket inclusion of ser-
vices under the Directive.
As there has yet to be a WTO Panel Decision specifically addressing GATS Article
XIV(c)(ii), scholars propose adopting the Panel Decision's methodology on GATT Article
XX exceptions in reaching an outcome on this issue. 253 First, a determination of a GATS
principle violation must be found. 254 Here, trade in tasks of data services processing is one
example of a potential violation of GATS MFN treatment. 255 As discussed earlier, the EU
treats some countries (such as the United States) less favorably than others, depending on
the EU's determination that a country provides inadequate data protection and thus sub-
jects them to new and higher barriers to market entry.256 Furthermore, studies indicate
that in practice, EU Member States do not pursue measures to meet the adequate levels of
248. See Eur. Comm'n, supra note 241; Bergkamp, supra note 232, at 39 - 40.
249. See GATT, supra note 128, art. I, art. m; GATS, supra note 128, arts. II, XVII.; see also WTO I-Tip
Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://i-tip.wto.org/services/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
250. GATS, supra note 128, art. XIV.
251. See supra text accompanying note 140.
252. MARIA VERONICA PEREz ASINAI, THE WTO AND THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA. Do EU
MEAsuREs FALL wrHIN GATS EXCEPION? WHICH FUTURE FOR DATA PROTECTION WITHIN THE
WTO E-COMMERCE CoNTzrExr? 4 (2003), available at http://www.bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20
papers/2003ffhe%20VTO%20and%20the%20Protection%20ofo20Personal%20Data.%20Do%20EU%
20Measures%20Fall%20within%20GATS%20Exception.pdf.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. at 4.
255. Id.
256. See id.
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data protection that it demands from third countries. For instance, a 2001 international
comparison study on internet privacy indicated that U.S. sites surpassed EU sites by pro-
viding users with a choice to be on mailing lists, despite the EU requirement that all sites
do so. 2 5 7
Second, it must be determined whether the measure in question complies with the spirit
of GATS such that it is consistent with the agreement's aims as a whole. 258 The GATS
preamble offers insight, noting that it respects a member nation's right to pursue national
policy objectives. 259 The Directive falls into this mission, as it represents the EU's supra-
national policy of regulating in this area and advances the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, and many EU Member-State constitutions. 260 On the
other hand, it must also be noted that the GATS preamble begins with the following two
objectives:
Recognizing the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and develop-
ment of the world economy; Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of princi-
ples and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting
the economic growth of all trading partners and the development of developing
countries.261
Furthermore, the GATS preamble goes on to seek "an overall balance of rights and
obligations," indicating that valid national policy objectives do not automatically trump
trade liberalization goals.262
Next, it must be determined whether the measure in question is necessary for compli-
ance with a member nation's laws.263 Panels generally interpret this to mean no alterna-
tive measures that are less restrictive are available that would reasonably achieve the same
policy objective and are consistent with WTO provisions. 264 Here, the Directive's mea-
sures are likely not necessary to secure compliance with the EU data protection regime
because (1) the Directive only requires "adequate" foreign privacy protection as opposed
to "equivalent" or "identical" protection (as mandated by Safe Harbor agreements); and
(2) there is no empirical evidence to show that the Directive's measures are better than
other less restrictive mechanisms employed elsewhere, such as U.S. privacy self-
regulation. 265
Finally, it must be determined that the measure is "not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."266
257. Bergkamp, supra note 232, at 38.
258. AslrNAu, supra note 252, at 5.
259. Id. (quoting GATS, supra note 128, pmbl).
260. Id.
261. GATS,supra note 128, pmbl.
262. Id.
263. AsiNARi, supra note 252, at 5.
264. Id.
265. Bergkamp, supra note 232, at 39 - 40.
266. AsINARi, supra note 252, at 6 (quoting GATS, supra note 128, art. XIV).
WINTER 2013
438 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Here, a discriminatory measure is "arbitrary or unjustified" if the EU allowed personal
data transfer in one country and barred it in another, when both countries in equivalent
circumstances share or lack similar regulations. 267 A "disguised restriction" is premised on
protectionism, where the intent behind the Directive's third country adequacy determina-
tions is to give EU providers a competitive edge. 268 The "adequacy method" employed by
the EU is, by its nature, a subjective approach that examines third countries on case-by-
case basis (due to differences in legal and regulatory systems). 269 Using this method, the
EU assesses whether a third country has the principles of content and procedure required
for adequacy. 270 In taking the case of the United States for example, the above analysis of
discriminatory treatment by the EU indicates that the Directive may work as a "disguised
restriction," given U.S. supremacy in data-intensive markets and the lack of empirical
evidence that U.S. mechanisms are inferior. Given the likelihood of findings against the
Directive in almost all these four assessments, the use of anti-offshoring measures such as
those espoused by the EU fails to achieve legitimate public policy goals of greater data
protection and succeeds only in increasing trade barriers and transaction costs.
V. Conclusion
The international trade regime has made great inroads in trade liberalization of goods
and services for well over half a century, enabling economies across the globe to grow and
prosper with corresponding positive, diffusive effects on society.271 As the above analysis
demonstrates, anti-offshoring measures threaten the stability and strength of a suprana-
tional economic and legal framework built upon through many rounds of negotiations by
nations and the proliferation of cross-border business relationships. Because these mea-
sures serve to violate legally binding commitments that many nations have made to inter-
national and multilateral trade agreements and to incur negative economic impact at home
and abroad, it is vital to pursue alternative strategies to adjust for any adverse distribu-
tional effects that offshoring incurs.
While offshoring delivers long-term benefits in the aggregate, empirical evidence (as
discussed in this paper) confirms that at individual industry levels, this process of resource
reallocation results in worker job displacement and/or difficulty in finding employment
with comparable pay.272 Cross-country comparisons and country-specific studies have
demonstrated that pro-business policies such as labor market flexibility and investment,
coupled with labor support initiatives involving worker retraining and mobility, are an
optimal solution. 273 Based on this body of research, the resulting economic insecurity
arising from job displacement is mitigated when the presence of the following factors
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employment protection legislation), training and retraining programs, and unemployment
benefits. 274
Affirming such findings are country-specific examples, such as Denmark, that demon-
strate that labor market flexibility and labor support programs are effective strategies to
offset offshoring's negative distributional effects. 275 In Denmark, employment protection
is weak, as Danish firms have great flexibility in hiring and firing.276 To correct the ad-
verse effect of high job turnover rates, the country utilizes a "flexicurity" model that offers
incentives (e.g., relatively generous unemployment benefits) and penalties to motivate
workers towards quick re-employment (e.g., monitoring and sanctions to spur job search
efforts).277 Observers note that it is Denmark's focus on worker training and mobility,
rather than restrictive employment measures, that has enabled the country to thrive in
ever changing economic circumstances tied to the growth of international trade.278 These
policies made Denmark a desirable location for foreign firms and gave Danish firms a
competitive edge. 279 Danish workers also benefited, as these labor support programs
helped them quickly adjust and recover from job displacement and related costs arising
from international trade activities, such as offshoring. 2so While critics may point out that
such redistributionist policies would fail in larger and/or more diverse countries such as
the United States, due to the lack of collective goals and values, Denmark offers a real-life
example of how non-discriminatory trade measures (such as social welfare programs and
business-growth policies) may feasibly help nations adjust to and benefit from globaliza-
tion processes. 281 If nations seek lasting economic growth individually and collectively,
they must agree to trade-liberalizing, non-discriminatory measures in order to benefit
from inevitable changes in their industries and technology.
274. Id. at 165. For example, a 2010 Milberg and Winkler cross-country study of fifteen OECD countries,
spanning 1991 to 2008 and covering twenty-one manufacturing sectors, revealed that offshoring had a larger
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replacement benefits. Id. at 188.
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